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[1697] 
The Return of Results in Genetic Testing: 
Who Owes What to Whom, When, and Why? 
Stephanie A. Alessi* 
The field of genetic research has revolutionized modern medicine and will continue to 
do so in the years to come. For the people whose biological materials form the basis for 
this research, however, the research process may also lead to personal discoveries—
namely, it may expose information about their health, genetic predispositions, and 
other gene-linked characteristics. Researchers who uncover this kind of personal 
genetic information are likewise confronted with the question of whether they should—
or must—provide their subjects with feedback about their results. 
 
For subjects and researchers alike, the answer is unclear. Presently, there is little 
guidance as to these parties’ rights and responsibilities when it comes to the return of 
genetic results in a research setting. As a result, neither party has a clearly defined 
understanding of what to expect from the research relationship. This Article draws on 
recognized ethical and legal foundations to propose that genetic researchers should 
owe three limited legal duties to their research subjects regarding planning for, 
acquiring informed consent about, and reporting certain genetic findings. Considering 
the wide variation among individuals in terms of what genetic information they would 
like to know, this Article balances concerns for individual autonomy with the right to 
acquire personal health information, and it weighs those interests against the potential 
cost to socially beneficial genetic research. In balancing these considerations, this 
Article’s proposals for a limited set of duties offer a careful step toward clearly defining 
the rights and responsibilities of genetic researchers and their subjects. 
 
 
 * J.D., University of California, Hastings College of Law, 2013; B.A., Stanford University, 2009. 
Many thanks to Professor Jaime King, whose support and guidance have been invaluable in writing 
this Article and throughout law school. Thanks also to Dane, Ben, Margot, and the rest of the Hastings 
Law Journal staff for the many hours they have dedicated to making this Volume a success. 
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With the advent of large-scale genetic research, discoveries about 
the human race that never before seemed possible are becoming a 
reality. Potentially lifesaving and life-changing concepts that were once 
elements of science fiction, such as the emerging fields of personalized 
medicine and pharmacogenomics, are now within reach.1 To support 
these scientific discoveries, biobanks catalog library-sized collections of 
DNA samples and offer researchers access to an increasingly diverse 
supply of genetic material to use in their research.2 These stored samples 
provide the means for studies that will eventually uncover benefits about 
which we can now only speculate. 
Despite the enormous potential of genetic research, the research 
process itself has potentially troublesome implications for the human 
subjects who contribute their genetic materials. Chief among these 
concerns is the question of what to do with the individual data that arise as 
a result of genetic research. Genetic material may reveal features of a 
 
 1. See, e.g., Francis S. Collins et al., A Vision for the Future of Genomics Research, 422 Nature 
835, 843 (2003). 
 2. See Mark Stranger & Jane Kaye, Governing Biobanks: An Introduction, in Principles and 
Practice in Biobank Governance 1, 2 (Jane Kaye & Mark Stranger eds., 2009). 
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person that she was not even aware existed because a gene typically only 
becomes visible when it impacts the observable characteristic in one’s 
phenotypic profile. Nonetheless, this genetic information may provide 
useful insight into one’s health status that, if available, many individuals 
would want to know.3 
Placing a responsibility on researchers to provide subjects with all 
theoretically interesting or useful information, however, can detract time 
and resources from a study’s primary purpose. As such, researchers are 
often forced to balance the subjects’ personal interests against their 
research goals. Yet there exist no uniform standards on which either 
researchers or subjects may rely as they perform this balancing act. 
Although researchers are guided by the broad command that, “no matter 
how important the research questions, it is not ethical to use human 
participants without appropriate protections,”4 they have little guidance 
to help determine what constitute appropriate protections when they 
must decide whether to return genetic research results. Participants also 
lack clear guidance as to what information they are entitled to receive.5 
Both parties are thus left with the unanswered question: To what extent 
is there an ethical obligation, and to what extent should there be a legal 
duty, to return results to a research subject? 
When considering this question, it is crucial to remember that there 
is wide variation in individuals’ expectations about their participation in 
genetic research.6 One example that underscores the importance of 
 
 3. See, e.g., Stephanie M. Fullerton et al., Return of Individual Research Results from Genome-
Wide Association Studies: Experience of the Electronic Medical Records and Genomics (eMERGE) 
Network, 14 Genetics Med. 424, 425 (2012) (“The rationale for returning such findings is to provide 
patients with the opportunity for appropriate medical management.”). 
 4. Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 851 (Md. 2001) (quoting Nat’l 
Bioethics Advisory Comm’n, Ethical and Policy Issues in Research Involving Human 
Participants 2–3 (2000) (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 5. The line between genetic research and clinical care can often be blurry to research subjects 
and their families; therefore, simply because information is gathered for research purposes does not 
relieve researchers of the ethical responsibility to warn them of any negative findings. See D. Pullman 
& K. Hodgkinson, Genetic Knowledge and Moral Responsibility: Ambiguity at the Interface of Genetic 
Research and Clinical Practice, 69 Clinical Genetics 199, 199–200 (2006); see also infra Part II.D. 
 6. See, e.g., Ellen Wright Clayton, Incidental Findings in Genetic Research Using Archived DNA, 
36 J.L. Med. & Ethics 286, 289 (2008). For example, one particularly complex allele that is associated 
with heightened cardiovascular risk is also associated with Alzheimer’s disease. Id. While an individual 
may want to undergo genetic testing to understand her risk of developing heart disease, she may 
prefer not to know one way or another about her risk of developing Alzheimer’s disease. Id.; see also 
J.S. Roberts et al., Using Alzheimer’s Disease as a Model for Genetic Risk Disclosure: Implications for 
Personal Genomics, 80 Clinical Genetics 407 (2011) (examining participants’ psychological and 
behavioral responses to learning about their genetic risks of developing Alzheimer’s disease). The 
National Human Genome Research Institute recently awarded $5.7 million in grants for more data-
driven studies of subjects’ reactions to finding out results of genetic research. NHGRI Funds Return of 
Results Studies, Forms Expert Consortium, Johns Hopkins Berman Inst. of Bioethics 
Announcements (Sept. 26, 2011), http://www.bioethicsbulletin.org/archive/nhgri-funds-return-of-
results-studies-forms-expert-consortium. Ultimately, that funding is designed to help the scientific and 
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understanding that variation is the story of the Havasupai Tribe.7 
Members of this isolated southwestern Native American tribe submitted 
blood samples to a genetic researcher for a study on diabetes, but 
unbeknownst to the tribe members, their blood samples were saved and 
used in subsequent studies to which they had not intended to consent.8 
These studies uncovered stigmatizing information about the rate of 
schizophrenia in tribe members and genetic evidence of their evolutionary 
migration patterns that contradicted the religious folklore about their 
spiritual origins.9 Although the researchers, who viewed these studies as 
socially beneficial, had assumed the tribe members would have no 
concern about the use of their donated DNA samples for additional 
research topics beyond diabetes, the tribe members felt it was a 
fundamental violation of their rights to use their DNA to study topics to 
which they had not initially agreed.10 
The case of the Havasupai Tribe illustrates that a subject’s 
autonomy interests do not necessarily align with a researcher’s goals. 
Likewise, for a variety of reasons—spiritual, cultural, personal, or 
otherwise—individuals may simply not want to know the results that 
researchers discover about them.11 The Havasupai case highlights the 
need to maintain secure protections to ensure that every participant in 
every study gives appropriate informed consent and is able to opt out of 
both participating in future studies and receiving any results. Whether or 
not a researcher agrees with an individual’s decision to forego learning 
about her genetic future, the research design and governance must allow 
individuals to make such decisions as they see fit. 
 
legal communities better understand what participants expect when they provide genetic material and 
thereby help develop a set of best practices with regard to the practical and ethical implications of 
returning genetic research results. Id. 
 7. See generally Havasupai Tribe v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 204 P.3d 1063 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008). 
 8. Id. at 1067. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. Eventually, Arizona State University “agreed to pay $700,000 to 41 of the tribe’s members, 
return the blood samples and provide other forms of assistance to the impoverished Havasupai—a 
settlement that legal experts said was significant because it implied that the rights of research subjects 
can be violated when they are not fully informed about how their DNA might be used.” Amy 
Harmon, Indian Tribe Wins Fight to Limit Research of Its DNA, N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/22/us/22dna.html. 
 11. See, e.g., Barbara Bowles Biesecker et al., Psychosocial Factors Predicting BRCA1/BRCA2 
Testing Decisions in Members of Hereditary Breast and Ovarian Cancer Families, 93 Am. J. Med. 
Genetics 257, 257 (2000) (analyzing the factors influencing the testing decisions of individuals with 
family histories of breast and ovarian cancer and finding that those who were younger, had optimistic 
personalities, and belonged to cohesive families were most likely to undergo genetic testing); 
Kimberley A. Quaid & Michael Morris, Reluctance to Undergo Predictive Testing: The Case of 
Huntington Disease, 45 Am. J. Med. Genetics 41, 43 (1993) (finding that some individuals who are at 
risk for Huntington’s disease choose not to undergo predictive testing because of the lack of a cure for 
the disease, the potential impact on health insurance, the fear of putting their children at risk, and the 
personal impact of knowing about their impending disease). 
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Similarly, when developing governance schemes for genetic research, 
protecting the confidentiality of participants’ information must also be a 
priority. With the threat—or at least the fear of the threat—of genetic 
discrimination in employment and in the insurance industry,12 many 
individuals feel a strong incentive to keep their genetic information 
private. Any guidelines on this issue must also take account of and protect 
these privacy interests. 
This Article balances three competing goals—promoting socially 
beneficial genetic research, protecting individual health and access to 
personal information, and preserving individual autonomy and privacy—
and proposes the adoption of specific, limited duties regarding planning 
for, acquiring informed consent about, and reporting genetic results. 
These duties must be uniformly and narrowly drawn so as to neither 
impede scientific progress nor interfere with individuals’ rights to their 
personal autonomy and privacy, but they must also be broad enough to 
ensure research participants appropriate access to their personal health 
information. As more people undergo genetic testing, and as the scientific 
community clarifies more genotype-phenotype links, it will become 
increasingly common for investigators to uncover genetic findings that 
have potentially important implications.13 As such, there is an increasing 
need to establish a coherent and consistent way to deal with these 
findings. 
This Article attempts to develop a comprehensive set of guidelines 
on which researchers and participants can steadfastly rely. Part I 
describes the different contexts in which genetic results can arise and 
discusses the unique infrastructures in which genetic researchers operate. 
Parts II and III explore the possible sources of ethical and legal duties as 
they apply to sharing research results with subjects. Finally, Part IV 
proposes three specific recommendations of legal duties that researchers 
should owe to their subjects, taking into consideration the infrastructure 
and logistics, ethical implications, and legal doctrines relating to genetic 
research. 
 
 12. See, e.g., Karen H. Rothenberg & Sharon F. Terry, Before It’s Too Late—Addressing Fear of 
Genetic Information, 297 Science 196, 196–97 (2002) (“It is only reasonable to be concerned that 
health insurers and employers may not fully understand the implications and limitations of genetic test 
results and the complex relationships between genotype and phenotype. . . . [O]nce genetic 
information enters databases, it will be extremely hard to remove it or prevent disclosure. When the 
public appreciates the extent of use of genetic information for nonmedical purposes, it will only 
further exacerbate fear of discrimination and loss of privacy.”); cf. Pullman & Hodgkinson, supra note 
5, at 202 (“[G]enetic privacy is a somewhat fickle matter, dependent to a large extent on the 
phenotypic expression of the particular genetic condition. . . . Concerns about insurability can also be 
misleading, as knowledge of serious genetic disease in the family has to be disclosed, regardless of 
individual disease status.”). 
 13. See Isaac S. Kohane et al., Reestablishing the Researcher-Patient Compact, 316 Science 836, 
836 (2007). 
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I.  The Context 
In order to know what society can and should demand of researchers, 
it is crucial to understand the framework in which they operate. Genetic 
research can produce results in several different contexts, each of which 
has unique features that determine what kind of relationship the 
researcher has with her subjects and what procedures for delivering those 
results are feasible. It is thus necessary to consider how different types of 
results might arise within different settings before prescribing across-the-
board legal duties. This Part explores three specific points during a study 
at which researchers should be prepared to address the possibility of 
finding such results: the institutional review board’s evaluation of the 
study, the potential discovery of incidental findings, and the use of 
biobanking to store samples. 
A. Institutional Review Board Oversight 
The most straightforward way that genetic results may arise is as a 
product of a study in which the participant knowingly takes part and to 
which she directly consents. If a study tests for specific genetic links, the 
research protocol can address which of those results will be shared with 
the participant and to what extent. Institutional review board (“IRB”) 
oversight standardizes this process. IRBs are formal committees that 
review and approve research protocols concerning human subjects.14 
They determine whether a proposed study design meets federal 
standards and is therefore eligible for federal funding and regulatory 
approval.15 “An IRB’s primary role is to assure the safety of human 
research subjects,”16 which means that during the review process the IRB 
is responsible for addressing any problems with the protocol and 
ensuring that, before participants contribute any biological materials, 
they are fully aware of what results they will and will not receive.17 
Knowing what types of results the researchers will produce allows IRBs a 
full opportunity to consider the financial, physical, and psychological 
 
 14. Lori B. Andrews et al., Genetics: Ethics, Law and Policy 94 (3d ed. 2010). The 
Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) requires that any institution seeking federal 
funding for research on human subjects have an IRB review its protocols in accordance with HHS 
policy. Basic HHS Policy for Protection of Human Research Subjects, 45 C.F.R. § 46.122 (2009). To 
qualify under the regulation, the IRB must have at least five members who are sufficiently qualified 
and both personally and professionally diverse, including at least one member who is not otherwise 
affiliated with the institution. Id. § 46.107. 
 15. Henry T. Greely, The Control of Genetic Research: Involving the “Groups Between”, 33 Hous. 
L. Rev. 1397, 1401 n.8 (1997). 
 16. Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 814 (Md. 2001). 
 17. See id. at 813 (“Generally, their primary functions are to assess the protocols of the project to 
determine whether the project itself is appropriate, whether the consent procedures are adequate, 
whether the methods to be employed meet proper standards, whether reporting requirements are 
sufficient, and the assessment of various other aspects of a research project.”). 
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burdens of returning results to participants, including concerns about 
both false positive and false negative reports.18 
In recognition of the potentially serious implications of returning 
genetic results, the Department of Health and Human Services’ Office 
for Human Research Protections has issued a guidebook that requires 
IRBs to make sure that research protocols minimize harm by providing 
for genetic counseling any time a researcher delivers genetic 
information.19 This requirement reflects the judgment that merely 
disclosing findings may not sufficiently ensure that an individual 
completely understands the implications of a genetic diagnosis.20 
Researchers, after all, are often not medically trained and therefore may 
not be skilled in effectively communicating serious clinical information.21 
By contrast, genetic counselors are specifically trained to interpret 
genetic and medical information and to convey that information to 
patients in a way that helps them understand and respond to genetic 
risks.22 During review, the IRB can ensure that the study protocol has a 
plan in place to refer participants for genetic counseling that is tailored to 
the kind of information the investigators foresee finding in the course of 
the study. 
Despite this requirement, however, current IRB regulations do not 
thoroughly reflect the present state of genetic technology. The regulations 
leave too much room for variation in how researchers decide which results 
to return.23 If researchers’ and participants’ expectations about studies 
are to be nationally uniform, there must be additional standards to 
specify how these issues should be addressed so as to promote the 
development of widespread reliance on, and trust in, genetic research.24 
B. Incidental Findings 
Planning for results becomes increasingly difficult when the results 
cannot be predicted, as is the case with incidental findings. An incidental 
finding is “a finding concerning an individual research participant that 
has potential health or reproductive importance and is discovered in the 
 
 18. Susan M. Wolf et al., The Law of Incidental Findings in Human Subjects Research: 
Establishing Researchers’ Duties, 36 J.L. Med. & Ethics 361, 366–67 (2008). 
 19. Id. at 367; see IRB Guidebook, Office for Human Research Protections (2003), available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/archive/irb/irb_guidebook.htm (overseeing the rights and wellbeing of human 
subjects in HHS-supported research).  
 20. Moira A. Keane, Institutional Review Board Approaches to the Incidental Findings Problem, 
36 J.L. Med. & Ethics 352, 355 (2008). 
 21. Id. at 354. 
 22. FAQs About Genetic Counselors and the NSGC, Nat’l Soc’y of Genetic Counselors, 
http://www.nsgc.org/About/FAQsaboutGeneticCounselorsandtheNSGC/tabid/143/Default.aspx (last 
visited July 30, 2013). 
 23. Keane, supra note 20, at 352–53. 
 24. See id. 
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course of conducting research but is beyond the aims of the study.”25 For 
example, testing a multi-functional gene for its role in one disease might 
indicate unexpected results about a different disease or condition.26 
Similarly, a study of the genetic aspects of a certain disease might 
inadvertently reveal that a nearby gene—not included in the study but 
close enough that the researcher might notice—has a potentially 
dangerous mutation.27 Incidental findings occur frequently, and as routine 
whole genome sequencing becomes increasingly common, the potential 
to find incidental results will only continue to grow.28 
Incidental findings in the genetic context can range in severity, 
including anything from a serious health problem to a misattribution of 
paternity.29 Because different types of findings will have different physical, 
psychological, and sociological implications, standardizing treatment of 
these findings is challenging.30 Therefore, the factors that researchers use 
to decide which incidental findings to return must be able to account for 
these variations. 
There is no current consensus, however, as to what those factors are, 
which makes it difficult for both the researchers and the reviewing IRBs 
to address the problem of incidental findings in their research protocols.31 
Furthermore, IRBs must consider whether some results might cause 
more harm than benefit to the subject if they are disclosed. For instance, 
 
 25. Susan M. Wolf et al., Managing Incidental Findings in Human Subjects Research: Analysis and 
Recommendations, 36 J.L. Med. & Ethics 219, 219 (2008). 
 26. Clayton, supra note 6, at 289. 
 27. Id. at 288. 
 28. Mildred K. Cho, Understanding Incidental Findings in the Context of Genetics and Genomics, 
36 J.L. Med. & Ethics 280, 281 (2008); Ma’n H. Zawati & Amélie Rioux, Biobanks and the Return of 
Research Results: Out with the Old and In with the New?, 39 J.L. Med. & Ethics 614, 616 (2011). Cho 
cites improvements in genetic research data and its availability to a wide range of researchers, as well 
as the increasingly clear links between genetics and medicine, as some of the primary factors behind 
this growth. Cho, supra, at 281. 
 29. Wolf et al., supra note 18, at 362 (“Genetic family studies are estimated to reveal 
misattributed paternity in about 10 percent of research participants in the general population.”); see 
Clayton, supra note 6, at 288 (“By far the most common incidental finding in genetics is misattributed 
paternity, which is typically estimated to occur in 1–10 percent of pregnancies.”). 
 30. Clayton, supra note 6, at 290. 
 31. Keane, supra note 20, at 353; Wolf et al., supra note 18, at 362. Recently, the American 
College of Medical Genetics and Genomics released a report recommending how to approach 
incidental findings in the context of clinical genome sequencing. Robert C. Green et al., Am. Coll. 
of Med. Genetics & Genomics, ACMG Recommendation for Reporting of Incidental Findings in 
Clinical Exome and Genome Sequencing (2013). The report specifies a list of serious gene-linked 
diseases for which “prevalence may be high and intervention may be possible” and states that, for 
findings related to these particular conditions, the duty to warn patients “supersedes concerns about 
autonomy.” Id. at 11. In addition to recognizing the ethical concerns regarding this potential violation 
of the “right not to know,” id., the report also notes that “there are insufficient data on clinical utility 
to fully support these recommendations” and calls for ongoing updates thereto. Id. at 3. Though 
imperfect, this sort of analysis can be useful in developing and improving the approach to incidental 
findings in the research setting. 
Alessi_64-HLJ-1697 (Do Not Delete) 9/25/2013 12:43 PM 
August 2013] RETURN OF RESULTS IN GENETIC TESTING 1705 
informing a subject of a genetic abnormality that either has unclear 
health implications or lacks any available treatment could cause 
significant psychological distress.32 Returning ambiguous genetic findings, 
especially outside of the clinical setting, may cause unnecessary alarm, in 
some cases leaving the individual worse off than if she had been told 
nothing.33 Nonetheless, although it is “impossible to anticipate everything 
that might be discovered,” as the scientific community’s understanding of 
genetics improves, it will be possible to more readily distinguish between 
serious diseases and minor genetic risks.34 Researchers should therefore 
be prepared to consider these distinctions and plan how they will make 
these determinations. 
C. Biobanks 
The practice of biobanking further complicates the problem of 
returning the results of genetic research. Biobanks establish an 
infrastructure upon which genetic researchers can conduct unspecified 
future research.35 They gather and warehouse blood samples either by 
donation36 or, in some cases, by collection of discarded clinical samples.37 
By receiving, storing, and providing biological materials, biobanks 
furnish researchers with a supply of genetic information that they can use 
 
 32. Keane, supra note 20, at 353. It is common for individuals who are at risk for certain chronic 
illnesses to forego predictive testing due to the psychological implications of knowing that one is living 
with an incurable disease. See, e.g., Biesecker et al., supra note 11 (breast cancer); Quaid & Morris, 
supra note 11 (Huntington’s disease); Roberts et al., supra note 6 (Alzheimer’s disease). 
 33. Wolf et al., supra note 18, at 364; see also U.K. Biobank, Ethics and Governance 
Framework Version 3.0, at 7 (2007), available at http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2011/05/ EGF20082.pdf (“[T]he value of such feedback is questionable because the 
data would be communicated outside of a clinical setting and would not have been evaluated in the 
context of the full medical record. . . . Further, it is not likely to be constructive, and might even be 
harmful (including causing undue alarm and having potentially adverse effects on insurance and 
employment status), to provide information without prior counseling or support.”). 
 34. Clayton, supra note 6, at 290. For example, repeated studies of specific genes are likely to give 
rise to findings that become more predictable over time and with research experience. Cho, supra note 
28, at 282. In contrast, incidental findings are more difficult to anticipate in non-specific, exploratory 
genetic research. Id. at 281–82. 
 35. Zawati & Rioux, supra note 28, at 615. 
 36. Individuals sometimes provide materials “specifically for research purposes.” Leslie E. Wolf, 
Advancing Research on Stored Biological Materials: Reconciling Law, Ethics, and Practice, 11 Minn. 
J.L. Sci. & Tech. 99, 100 (2010). Notably, however, at least one court has found that those who donate 
their biological materials have no right to determine how the biobank uses those materials. Id. at 101–
02 (citing Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d 985 (E.D. Mo. 2006)). 
 37. Id. at 100 (“Stored biological materials come from a variety of sources, such as newborn blood 
spots taken for screening purposes [and] blood, tissues, and other materials taken for clinical 
diagnostic purposes . . . .”); see D.M. Roden et al., Development of a Large-Scale De-Identified DNA 
Biobank to Enable Personalized Medicine, 84 Clinical Pharmacology & Therapeutics 362, 362 
(2008) (describing the “opt-out” system for amassing discarded, de-identified blood samples initially 
collected for clinical purposes at Vanderbilt University Medical Center). 
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to conduct broad, population-based studies.38 Ultimately, the goal of 
biobanking is to supply enough biological information so that scientists 
can analyze links between genotypes and phenotypes, determine the 
causes of common tendencies across a population, and develop tools to 
apply those results generally to medicine.39 By design, biobanks aim to 
help society rather than individual donors, a structure that encourages 
little institutionalized concern for the individual biobank depositor. As a 
result, despite the many societal benefits of biobanking, the policies of 
biobanks often do not account for individuals’ concerns about accessing 
their results. 
When they communicate test results, genetic researchers may choose 
to give feedback in a variety of ways: initial lab analysis and feedback, 
aggregate results from the study, and individual results after the research is 
completed.40 Typically, as long as the participant consents to finding out 
her results, the initial feedback can be provided to her or her physician 
immediately at the time of donation to the biobank.41 But the aggregate 
and individual research results of studies on biobanked materials pose a 
similar problem to that of incidental findings: It is not feasible to account 
for all potential future research at the moment the individual first 
contributes her DNA. In determining whether to return these results, 
researchers who rely on biobanks for their biological materials must 
weigh whether to alert the entire research cohort and risk scaring people 
with potential false positives or to re-identify individuals and only 
present specific participants with their findings.42 In some cases, it may be 
possible to do both by sending an update to all donors about general 
findings and then providing individualized information where it is 
warranted.43 However, individual follow-up without the guidance of a 
genetic counselor can be inadequate and psychologically risky, especially 
if the donor made her initial contribution to the biobank in the distant 
past and does not expect to receive any feedback.44 
Researchers can use the informed consent process to alleviate some 
of the psychological risks of returning unexpected genetic findings. One 
solution is to obtain informed consent at the beginning of every study by 
 
 38. Zawati & Rioux, supra note 28, at 615. 
 39. Roden et al., supra note 37, at 365. Public support is crucial for biobanks, “as it is only with 
continued donation of samples and data, and large-scale investment programmes that genomic 
research will continue.” Stranger & Kaye, supra note 2, at 2. 
 40. Zawati & Rioux, supra note 28, at 615. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Kohane et al., supra note 13, at 836. 
 43. See Zawati & Rioux, supra note 28, at 615–16. Many biobanks, for instance, send regular 
newsletters to biobank contributors with information about the latest research on their biological 
materials. Id. 
 44. See Clayton, supra note 6, at 286–87. 
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re-contacting donors and allowing them to opt out.45 Others argue that 
general informed consent to all future research is sufficient and avoids 
the administrative hurdles involved in re-contacting every donor.46 
However, if this general informed consent does not fully disclose all of 
the actual risks and benefits of contributing genetic information to a 
biobank—namely, those associated with having one’s materials used in 
unspecified studies and finding out (or not finding out) the results—it 
may, like in the case of the Havasupai Tribe, not truly reflect the 
participants’ choices and thus invalidate their consent.47 Because the 
protocols for future research projects have not yet been designed, a donor 
cannot fully understand the benefits and risks of agreeing to take part in 
subsequent studies at the time of donation.48 Thus, if the informed consent 
process is not carefully designed and reviewed, it may leave unresolved 
many of the psychological risks that go along with returning results to 
biobank contributors. 
Further complicating the problem of returning results is the de-
identification of biological materials stored in biobanks. Biological 
materials are typically stripped of the donor’s identifying information 
and stored with a code that can connect the material back to her in the 
future. “The value of the biobank,” after all, “is largely contingent upon 
being able to link the samples with donor information and its value 
increases with the depth and quality of the information.”49 Although it 
may prove difficult to return results where the data are de-identified and 
stored over a long period of time (largely due to the associated 
administrative barriers),50 a significant number of people are comfortable 
with researchers using their de-identified genetic information so long as 
they are notified in advance and are given the opportunity to consent or 
refuse.51 Proponents argue that this kind of advance-consent procedure 
could benefit society immensely. Such a procedure could increase 
donations of materials to the biobank and thereby allow the study of 
many different phenotype-allele connections without creating any 
 
 45. Id. 
 46. See Lukas Gundermann & Ulrich Stockter, Co-Determination of Donors in Biobanks, in 
Principles and Practice in Biobank Governancem, supra note 2, at 69, 71 (“[T]he general need for 
explicit informed consent can be abandoned if a substantial public interest so requires. . . . It also 
justifies a reduced standard of informed consent, for example, allowing for a one-time broad consent 
plus additional elements that safeguard autonomy.”). 
 47. See supra notes 6–11 and accompanying text. This may undermine not only the participants’ 
rights but also the development of the biobank and the research conducted on the materials stored in it. 
 48. Clayton, supra note 6, at 287. 
 49. Stranger & Kaye, supra note 2, at 2. 
 50. Fullerton et al., supra note 3, at 429. 
 51. Roden et al., supra note 37, at 363. In response to a survey of clinical research patients, 90% were 
“comfortable with the idea of anonymized genetic information being used for research,” and 5% were 
opposed. Id. When given fully informed consent, including a description of the DNA databank, and allowed 
to opt out of having their materials included by checking a box, roughly 2.5% of patients did so. Id. 
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serious risks of discrimination or breach of privacy due to the anonymity 
of the data.52 
In recognition of the ethical and logistic dilemmas that arise from the 
return of individual results, many biobanks explicitly prohibit returning 
any such results and inform research participants of this prohibition upon 
the initial submission of their biological materials.53 For instance, 
CARTaGENE, the Université de Montréal’s biobank, specifies that “[n]o 
results from future research projects using data or samples will be 
communicated to participants.”54 Other institutions take the same 
approach but recognize caveats under which they will disclose information 
if it is reasonably clear that the benefits of doing so outweigh any risks to 
the individuals or their families.55 
Although many biobanks are already considering how different 
factors affect their decisions about returning research results to individuals, 
there is no standardized way that they make this determination. To create 
a clear set of rules upon which researchers and potential donors may rely, 
it is necessary to consider how established ethical principles and legal 
regimes prescribe the treatment of these kinds of problems. The following 
two Parts examine the relevant ethical and legal foundations, respectively, 
in which such rules may be grounded. 
II.  Ethical Foundations 
Reflected in national and international guidelines, as well as our 
understanding of individual rights, certain ethical principles are 
consistently recognized throughout U.S. law and policy. These principles 
should shape genetic researchers’ legal obligations to their subjects, 
irrespective of the specific legal regime in which those obligations may be 
grounded. Because genetic research operates within an emerging and 
sparsely developed area of the law, these ethical foundations provide 
crucial guidance in developing appropriate and principled duties. This 
Part describes the origins of these ethical standards. 
A.  National Principles 
In the late 1970s, the National Commission for the Protection of 
Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research delineated a set 
of ethical principles for human subjects research in the Belmont Report.56 
 
 52. Id. at 365. 
 53. Zawati & Rioux, supra note 28, at 616–17. 
 54. CARTaGENE, Université de Montréal, Information Brochure for Participants 10. 
 55. See, e.g., ALSPAC Ethics & Law Comm., Univ. of Bristol, Policy Guidance Regarding 
Divulging Biomedical Information to Participants (2010). 
 56. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., The Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and 
Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of Research (1979) [hereinafter The Belmont 
Report], available at http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/policy/belmont.html. The 1974 signing of the National 
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The Belmont Report is simply a policy statement, but it lays out the basic 
ethical guidelines for human subjects research and prescribes how those 
principles should be applied.57 
The Belmont Report sets out two general rules that should underlie 
all research: “(1) do not harm and (2) maximize possible benefits and 
minimize possible harms.”58 These rules are at the core of the Belmont 
Report’s discussion of how to deal with returning research results: 
In all cases of research involving incomplete disclosure, such research 
is justified only if it is clear that (1) incomplete disclosure is truly 
necessary to accomplish the goals of the research, (2) there are no 
undisclosed risks to subjects that are more than minimal, and (3) there 
is an adequate plan for debriefing subjects, when appropriate, and for 
dissemination of research results to them.59 
Though written years before genetic research was commonplace, 
this language implies that researchers are obliged to provide their human 
research subjects with fully informed consent and to decide in advance 
how they will deal with returning genetic research results. At the same 
time, it recognizes that disclosure may be limited if it would impede the 
aims of the research. Part IV discusses these conclusions in greater detail,60 
but it is clear that the Belmont Report contemplates some measure of 
ethical duty for researchers to report results. 
B. International Principles 
In addition to recognizing the importance of protecting human 
research subjects at a national level, the United States has signed on to 
globally recognized declarations asserting and preserving the right to 
human dignity in research. The Nuremberg Code, drafted in the wake of 
horrific and tragic human experimentation during World War II, asserts 
ten principles of human subjects research.61 The Nuremberg Code 
specifies that research on humans must “avoid all unnecessary physical 
and mental suffering and injury,”62 which suggests that the psychological 
health of human research subjects should be a primary concern when 
researchers are crafting a protocol for returning results. 
Building upon the Nuremberg Code, the Declaration of Helsinki 
announced the World Medical Association’s Ethical Principles for Medical 
 
Research Act created this commission and charged it with developing ethical guidelines to underline 
research on human subjects. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at B.2. 
 59. Id. at C.1 (emphasis omitted). 
 60. See infra Part IV. 
 61. Nuremberg Code: Directives for Human Experimentation, 2 Trials of War Criminals Before 
the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10 181–82 (1949), available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/archive/nurcode.html. 
 62. Id. at no. 4. 
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Research Involving Human Subjects.63 The Declaration of Helsinki, first 
adopted in 1964 and amended several times since, proclaims that “the well-
being of the individual research subject must take precedence over all 
other interests.”64 The World Medical Association thus placed an 
affirmative, global priority on protecting human research subjects—even if 
at the expense of scientific discovery—and informed the researcher that 
she should always place her subjects’ well-being above the success of her 
research. 
These treaties, however, do not address and did not contemplate the 
intricacies of genetic research. Where it is unclear whether returning or 
not returning results will be more problematic, and where results may 
only be marginally useful to a subject as compared to the burden on the 
researcher, the treaties do not give a clear ethical answer. Rather, the 
researcher must weigh the specifics of the situation to decide what is in 
the best interest of her subjects. 
C.  Right to Personal Information 
Aside from formal declarations of the rights of human subjects, 
human beings have an interest in accessing their own personal health 
information.65 Although courts have held that an individual does not 
have a right of ownership in her cells,66 the same logic does not apply to 
one’s personal genetic information that may have potential health or 
reproductive consequences.67 For example, Congress recognized the right 
to one’s health information when it passed the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”).68 HIPAA gives individuals 
a right to access their personal health information, but in order to exercise 
that right, one must actively request the information.69 The obvious 
problem in applying HIPAA’s logic to genetic research results is that, 
where the results indicate the presence of a disease that may not be 
physically apparent, the individual may not have any idea what results 
exist about her and therefore cannot know to ask for them. Thus, imposing 
an affirmative duty on researchers to report results seems to be the only 
way to truly give individuals the informational access that they deserve. 
If applied too broadly, however, this proprietary interest could be 
problematic. A right to all genetic information could impose on 
 
 63. World Med. Ass’n, Declaration of Helsinki: Ethical Principles for Medical Research Involving 
Human Subjects (2008), available at http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/b3. 
 64. Id. at no. 6. 
 65. See Wolf et al., supra note 18, at 372. 
 66. See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 489 (Cal. 1990). 
 67. See Wolf et al., supra note 18, at 372. 
 68. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-191, 110 Stat. 
1936 (1996). 
 69. Id. § 1175; see Wolf et al., supra note 18, at 365. 
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researchers an enormous burden to look for information that is entirely 
beyond the aims of the study, which could undermine their research 
efforts.70 But if information relevant to a subject’s health is discovered in 
the ordinary course of research, there is a strong ethical argument that 
the individual is entitled to that information because providing access to 
personal information would not impose a substantial burden on the 
researcher. 
D.  Therapeutic Misconception 
The therapeutic misconception is another ground that supports an 
ethical duty to report results. When dealing with cases about human 
subjects research, courts have relied on this theory to support their 
findings of legal duties.71 The therapeutic misconception arises out of the 
trust that research participants place in the researcher and reflects a 
belief that participation in the research will provide them with a clinical 
benefit.72 Even if a subject purports to understand that there is no clinical 
relationship, her decision to permit the researcher to study her DNA 
may lead to an erroneous belief that any and all clinical results will be 
returned.73 
For example, when one woman who had been diagnosed with breast 
cancer encouraged her two sisters to take part in a university research 
study on the hereditary breast cancer gene BRCA1, they were told that 
their results were inconclusive, “received no regular status updates and, 
when [they] called . . . , [their] inquiries were met with annoyance.”74 
After three years of uncertainty, never knowing if or when the 
researchers would contact them, the woman’s two sisters both underwent 
preventative mastectomies—only to find out later that they did not have 
 
 70. Wolf et al., supra note 18, at 376. 
 71. See infra notes 102–112 and accompanying text. 
 72. Wolf et al., supra note 18, at 365–66. The therapeutic misconception was first identified during 
a psychiatric study in which it became clear that many of the subjects, despite having been told that 
their treatments were randomized, believed that they were assigned to the treatments that were best 
for their individual problems. Paul S. Appelbaum et al., The Therapeutic Misconception: Informed 
Consent in Psychiatric Research, 5 Int’l J.L. & Psychiatry 319, 319–23 (1982). 
 73. Wolf et al., supra note 18, at 365–66. In fMRI studies, for example, despite the lack of any 
physician-patient relationship, researchers have a general responsibility to do a diagnostic reading and 
follow up on any questionable results, largely in recognition of the participants’ reliance interests. Id. 
However, even when there is no such responsibility, it can be difficult for participants to understand 
the meaning of complicated informed consent documents, especially if, as is often true of individuals 
who are suffering from a serious illness, they are prone to “filter information [out] of their own sense 
of desperation.” Lisa M. Arkin et al., Confronting the Issues of Therapeutic Misconception, Enrollment 
Decisions, and Personal Motives in Genetic Medicine-Based Clinical Research Studies for Fatal 
Disorders, 16 Hum. Gene Therapy 1028, 1029 (2005). 
 74. Rebecca Fisher, A Closer Look Revisited: Are We Subjects or Are We Donors?, 14 Genetics 
Med. 458, 458 (2012). 
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the breast cancer gene and that the surgeries had been unnecessary.75 
Although the sisters expected their participation “to deliver actionable 
results specifically to [them],” the researchers viewed them “as only one 
set of data points among many.”76 As a result, the three sisters came away 
from the experience feeling a “profound sense of betrayal” and lost 
confidence in the medical profession.77 Even though the sisters had 
participated in the research to contribute to the growth of knowledge 
about the BRCA1 allele and seemed to understand the study’s 
population-based goals, they nonetheless felt entitled to some level of 
clinical care with regard to their genetic information.78 
Because a research participant’s reliance interest can be significant, 
informed consent material may not be sufficient to clearly establish the 
researcher’s responsibilities and manage participants’ expectations.79 It is 
human nature to rely on a person of greater knowledge and access to 
one’s health information and to expect disclosure if that information has 
negative implications. While a researcher may view the individual’s 
results as nothing more than a data point, to the participant they are 
infinitely more personal and meaningful. Consequently, even if an 
informed consent document specifies that participants should not expect 
to get any individual results back, a practical perspective with a focus on 
the social values of fairness and reciprocity suggests that they should be 
entitled to something more consistent and thorough than what they 
currently receive.  
If not done carefully, however, returning results may further 
encourage the therapeutic misconception by familiarizing research 
participants with the notion that researchers will provide them with all 
clinically relevant genetic information, whether related to the study or 
not.80 In reaction to this concern, some biobanks have already made 
efforts to limit their liability by including procedures about how to 
provide individual feedback and what caveats to include in order to keep 
research subjects from thinking that “the assessment is equivalent to a 
medical check-up.”81 Otherwise, an individual subject might misinterpret 
the goal of the research and where the project’s priorities lie—that is, in 
the population rather than the individual. The potential for 
misunderstanding makes it imperative that any legal duty to report 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See id. 
 80. Wolf et al., supra note 18, at 364. It is for this reason that many researchers expressly include a 
notice at the informed consent stage that they will not return any results. Id. In addition, because of 
the unclear guidance as to how much information to share, there remains the constant possibility of 
causing emotional distress by reporting too much. Id. 
 81. Zawati & Rioux, supra note 28, at 615. 
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results be narrowly drawn so as not to place a burden on researchers that 
will only undermine the research it aims to promote. 
III.  Sources of Legal Duty 
While no single U.S. law delineates researchers’ duties to return 
genetic results, there exists a strong legal background from which it is 
possible to develop appropriate duties. U.S. regulations and common law 
alike support some measure of a legal duty owed by researchers to their 
subjects. By examining the established jurisprudence as it relates to 
genetic researchers—together with the ethical principles described in 
Part II—it becomes possible to determine what types of legal obligations 
are feasible extensions of existing law. 
A. Regulatory Law: The Common Rule 
The U.S. Federal Policy on the Protection of Human Subjects—
known as the Common Rule—establishes the protection of human 
subjects as a national priority.82 Numerous federal agencies, including the 
Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”),83 have codified the 
Common Rule in their regulations.84 The Basic HHS Policy for 
Protection of Human Research Subjects mandates that IRBs approve 
human subjects research only if the participants’ risks are minimized85 
and “reasonable in relation to anticipated benefits, if any, to subjects, 
and the importance of the knowledge that may reasonably be expected 
to result.”86 It also requires an informed consent process characterized by 
a clear description of risks, benefits, and alternatives, as well as 
information about whom to contact if the subject has questions and an 
acknowledgement of the right to refuse or discontinue one’s 
participation in the research.87 “[W]hen appropriate,” the IRB may 
provide additional informed consent elements, including an agreement 
that the participant has a right to receive any future significant findings 
resulting from her participation in the research.88 In addition, the HHS 
 
 82. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects (‘Common Rule’), U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/commonrule/index.html (last visited July 30, 2013). 
 83. See Basic HHS Policy for Protection of Human Research Subjects, 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.100–.124 (2009). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. § 46.111(a)(1). Risks are minimized when the protocol uses procedures that are 
“consistent with sound research design” and, if possible, are already being used “for diagnostic or 
treatment purposes.” Id. 
 86. Id. § 46.111(a)(2). “The IRB,” however, “should not consider possible long-range effects of 
applying knowledge gained in the research (for example, the possible effects of the research on public 
policy) as among those research risks that fall within the purview of its responsibility.” Id. 
 87. Id. § 46.116(a). 
 88. Id. § 46.116(b). 
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Policy provides that a participant cannot waive any of her legal rights or 
release the researcher or institution from liability for negligence.89 
Despite this powerful regulatory language, which recognizes an 
individual subject’s right to protect herself when taking part in human 
subjects research, the Common Rule does not encompass a private cause 
of action, and no court to date has recognized such a right.90 Consequently, 
an individual who suffers harm as a result of a genetic researcher’s 
negligence in either returning or failing to return her results must find a 
cause of action beyond the Common Rule if she is to receive any court-
sanctioned remedy for her injury. 
B.  Common Law: Special Relationship 
At common law, researchers’ duties to the participants in their 
studies have traditionally been limited.91 Unlike in the medical context, in 
a non-clinical research setting there is no physician-patient relationship 
that easily establishes a duty to the research participant. Without such a 
duty, there is no legal requirement that the researcher take any 
affirmative steps to report results to a participant, so it is necessary to 
understand the extent to which the common law supports a duty from 
researcher to subject. While there may be other ways to establish these 
duties, this Subpart describes in detail the obligations that arise out of 
the special relationship between the researcher and the participant. 
When a physician conducts research in a clinical setting, the common 
law imposes certain duties on the patient based on the physician-patient 
relationship.92 Those same duties, however, do not necessarily apply where 
a researcher lacks a therapeutic relationship with the participant.93 A duty 
that goes too far in a purely research context could chill socially beneficial 
research and allow subjects control over the direction of research in which 
they are not otherwise invested.94 
Despite these concerns, and despite the limited case law dealing 
with researcher-participant disputes, one court has found that, under the 
 
 89. Id. § 46.116. 
 90. Wolf et al., supra note 18, at 368. 
 91. See generally Henry S. Richardson & Leah Belsky, The Ancillary-Care Responsibilities of 
Medical Researchers: An Ethical Framework for Thinking About the Clinical Care that Researchers 
Owe Their Subjects, 34 Hastings Ctr. Rep. 25 (2004) (describing the relationship between a researcher 
and her subject as creating a duty less than what a physician owes her patient but greater than the 
bounds of the research protocol). 
 92. See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal. 1990) (holding that a 
physician has a duty to disclose personal, non-health-related interests that may materially affect her 
medical judgment). 
 93. Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1070 (S.D. Fla. 
2003) (declining to extend the duty to disclose economic interests where a researcher is not in a 
therapeutic relationship with the patient). The court in Greenberg found that Moore was “clearly 
distinguishable” because of this lack of clinical dependence. Id. 
 94. Id. at 1070–71. 
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right circumstances, a researcher may have a legal duty to report 
individual results to participants in her research.95 Grimes v. Kennedy 
Krieger Institute involved a study on lead paint abatement in which 
investigators collected blood samples from children and dust samples 
from their homes in order to compare the changing levels of lead over a 
two-year period.96 Although the protocol did not contain any affirmative 
requirement that the research institute report results to the study 
participants, the parents were dismayed to discover that the researchers 
had not disclosed evidence that their children’s blood samples indicated 
they were suffering from lead poisoning.97 The court sided with the 
parents, holding that even when a clinical relationship is lacking, a 
special relationship can exist between a researcher and her subject that is 
sufficient to give rise to a duty to report individual results.98 Whether 
such a relationship exists, the court noted, is a question of fact to be 
made on a case-by-case basis.99 
Although the study in Grimes represents a somewhat different 
situation from genetic testing, the court’s analysis provides useful insight 
into the kinds of relationships that can trigger a duty of care. Notably, 
because the risk in Grimes was environmental rather than genetic, had 
the subjects been warned of the lead poisoning, it would have been 
possible for them to escape their peril by moving elsewhere.100 In 
addition, the researchers in Grimes encouraged many of the families in 
the study to live in homes where there was a known likelihood of risk.101 
In genetic testing, on the other hand, the results are often much less clear 
and the solutions less straightforward. Nonetheless, the relationships 
between researchers and subjects in both cases are analogous, so the 
analysis of the relationship in Grimes provides a worthwhile comparison. 
The Grimes court relied on two underlying theories to justify its 
result: the misalignment of interests between researchers and subjects 
and the knowledge gap between the two parties.102 Medical researchers, 
like physicians, have information about their subjects that the subjects 
likely do not know. Unlike physicians, however, researchers respond to 
 
 95. See generally Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807 (Md. 2001). 
 96. Id. at 822. 
 97. Id. at 824–29. 
 98. Id. at 846. The court also described the relationship as arising from the contractual agreement 
between the parties, which is a viable legal avenue but is outside the scope of this Subpart. See id. at 843–44. 
 99. Id. at 858 (“[U]nder certain circumstances, such research agreements can, as a matter of law, 
constitute “special relationships” giving rise to duties, out of the breach of which negligence actions may 
arise. We also hold that, normally, such special relationships are created between researchers and the 
human subjects used by the researchers. Additionally, we hold that governmental regulations can create 
duties on the part of researchers towards human subjects out of which “special relationships” can arise. 
Likewise, such duties and relationships are consistent with the provisions of the Nuremberg Code.”). 
 100. See id. at 812. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 837–51. 
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incentives that concern society as a whole rather than individual patients; 
thus, researchers lack an incentive to disclose individual results.103 
Although a study may benefit society’s greater good and a researcher 
may have only the best intentions, her interests are not aligned with 
those of the individual research participant, who “stands to gain nothing 
and lose everything, including his or her right of self-determination.”104 
Likewise, when researchers know more about the participants’ health 
than the participants themselves do, the participants “cannot and should 
not be solely responsible for their own protection.”105 Rather, where the 
information and interests are so misaligned as they are in cases like Grimes, 
the nature of the relationship between the two demands that the researcher 
be legally obligated to act in the participant’s best interest.106 In genetic 
research, the gap between what researchers and their subjects know is 
often even greater because genetic information can be uniquely difficult 
for laypersons to assess—a fact that strengthens Grimes’ reasoning were it 
to be applied in a similar case in the context of genetic research. 
The Grimes court also noted that IRB approval of an informed 
consent protocol cannot extinguish a researcher’s legal duty,107 which 
makes it crucial to understand prior to a study exactly what duties 
researchers owe human subjects. Particularly when genetic information is 
involved, some commentators view the informed consent process itself—
and the consequent entrusting of one’s rights in another person—as the 
crux of the broader rule that the Grimes court articulated.108 “Having 
gotten the participants to waive their rights against such access to private 
aspects of their bodies,” they argue, “the researchers obtain special 
responsibilities to look after the fundamental values that those rights 
normally protect.”109 That is, when a subject provides a researcher access 
into the privacy of her body and medical history, the researcher must 
take over the responsibility of dealing with any threats revealed in the 
course of exercising that privileged information.110 This partial 
 
 103. Id. at 838. 
 104. Id. at 837 (quoting Karine Morin, The Standard of Disclosure in Human Subject 
Experimentation, 19 J. Legal Med. 157 (1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Havasupai 
Tribe v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 204 P.3d 1063, 1066–67 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008) (recognizing the inherent 
misunderstanding between researchers, who saw their research as beneficial for all of society, and their 
subjects, who were nonetheless morally and religiously opposed to further research). 
 105. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 851 (quoting Nat’l Bioethics Advisory Comm’n, Ethical and Policy 
Issues in Research Involving Human Participants 3–4 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 106. See id. 
 107. Id. at 850–51 (“The duty to a vulnerable research subject is independent of consent, although 
the obtaining of consent is one of the duties a researcher must perform.”). 
 108. See Henry S. Richardson & Mildred K. Cho, Secondary Researchers’ Duties to Return 
Incidental Findings and Individual Research Results: A Partial-Entrustment Account, 14 Genetics 
Med. 467, 470 (2012). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
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entrustment theory, rather than focusing on ethical values like respect 
and reciprocity that may not as readily attach in the case of secondary 
research and biobanks,111 emphasizes that a duty arises the moment an 
individual puts her trust in somebody else who is prepared to accept that 
commitment.112 Under this logic, it may not even be necessary that the 
research participant ever meet the researcher, much less form a personal 
bond, only that she establish a special relationship by entrusting the 
researcher with her DNA and ensuring that the researcher accept that 
responsibility. 
Establishing a special relationship may also give rise to a duty to 
warn. A duty to warn may arise if an individual has information that, if 
disclosed, can help avoid a serious, foreseeable harm.113 In the context of 
research, such a duty may exist if there is “unequal knowledge and the 
defendant possessed of such knowledge, knows or should know that 
harm might occur if no warning is given.”114 Courts in duty to warn cases 
focus on the notion that one person should not withhold information 
from another when that information could protect the second individual 
from serious harm and when there is no significant cost to share it.115 For 
instance, if a researcher gets samples from a biobank and discovers that 
an individual research subject has a high chance of developing a deadly 
illness that can be prevented if treated early, the holder of the 
information (the researcher) faces little burden in warning the 
participant of a preventable disease that otherwise might kill her. In such 
a case, although some critics argue otherwise,116 there need not be any 
 
 111. See id. at 468–69. 
 112. See id. at 470. 
 113. See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 344–45 (Cal. 1976). 
 114. Wolf et al., supra note 18, at 370 (quoting Blaz v. Michael Reese Hosp. Found., 74 F. Supp. 2d 
803, 805 (N.D. Ill. 1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In Blaz v. Michael Reese Hospital 
Foundation, the court denied the defendant physician’s motion to dismiss when a former patient who 
had undergone radiation therapy as a child sued, arguing that the physician failed to adequately 
disclose the results of his subsequent research and warn the plaintiff of the risks of developing neural 
tumors. 74 F. Supp. 2d at 804, 807. The court cited four criteria established by the Illinois Supreme 
Court as those giving rise to a duty to warn: (1) the foreseeability of the harm, (2) the likelihood of the 
injury, (3) the weight of the burden of warning the plaintiff, and (4) the effect of that burden on the 
defendant. Id. at 805. Blaz, however, differs from the genetic research setting because the physician in 
that case directly caused the physical risk to the patient, rather than simply discovering a preexisting 
risk, making the consequences of placing the burden of warning the plaintiff different in the two 
scenarios. See id. at 806. 
 115. Wolf et al., supra note 18, at 371. 
 116. See Loane Skene, Feeding Back Significant Findings to Participants and Relatives, in 
Principles and Practice in Biobank Governance, supra note 2, at 161, 169. Critics also suggest that 
there is a causation problem inherent in this argument because the researcher does not actually cause 
the harm—that is, the genetic disorder—to the participant. Id. However, applying the loss of chance 
doctrine is helpful in these cases in allowing us to think of the harm suffered as the loss of a chance to 
get early, appropriate medical care. See Wolf et al., supra note 18, at 371; see also Herskovits v. Grp. 
Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 474, 476 (Wash. 1983) (“Some courts . . . have allowed the 
proximate cause issue [of whether a defendant increased the decedent’s risk of death by decreasing the 
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direct relationship between the researcher and the subject for the duty to 
apply117 because it depends not on a relationship but rather on the 
balance of the burden on one individual against the benefit to another.118 
The existing U.S. legal regimes reflect a recognition that participants 
in medical and genetic research deserve something more than simply 
knowing that they are a part of a socially beneficial study (and maybe a 
nominal stipend). Rather, as Grimes suggests, researchers should have a 
duty to offer feedback to their subjects when the information they can 
provide is of significant personal and medical value.119 Conversely, when 
certain genetic information is determined to be less valuable to 
individuals, the duty should not extend so far as to interfere with 
researchers’ other responsibilities.120 Delineating the boundary between 
the risks that must be disclosed and those that the researcher may keep 
to herself is crucial to avoid flooding researchers with responsibilities 
that might distract them from their research. Therefore, it is essential to 
thoroughly analyze how different factors, in isolation or in conjunction 
with others, affect the value of the genetic information in question and 
impact the decision whether to return it. The next Part discusses this 
balancing in depth. 
IV.  Recommendations 
Taking into consideration the infrastructure in which genetic 
researchers operate and the relevant ethical and legal foundations, this 
Article proposes that researchers should have three specific duties when 
dealing with the return of genetic research results: (1) to plan for the 
management of incidental findings, (2) to obtain fully informed consent 
as to the return of results, and (3) to offer to disclose a limited subset of 
 
chance of survival] to go to the jury on this type of proof. These courts emphasized the fact that 
defendants’ conduct deprived the decedents of a ‘significant’ chance to survive or recover, rather than 
requiring proof that with absolute certainty the defendants’ conduct caused the physical injury. The 
underlying reason is that it is not for the wrongdoer, who put the possibility of recovery beyond 
realization, to say afterward that the result was inevitable.” (citations omitted)). 
 117. Cf. Pate v. Threlkel, 661 So. 2d 278, 282 (Fla. 1995) (holding that a doctor’s duty to warn relatives 
of her patient’s genetically transferable condition could be discharged by warning the patient herself). 
 118. See Richardson & Cho, supra note 108, at 468. 
 119. See Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 834 (Md. 2001). For example, in the 
case of treatable genetic disorders that are indicated by a single gene, the availability of immediate 
clinical solutions can vastly increase the potential benefits of disclosure to the subject. Pullman & 
Hodgkinson, supra note 5, at 200, 202. 
 120. This determination should be based on an objective reasonable person standard—that is, by 
asking what information would be material to a reasonable person in the position of the plaintiff, 
taking into account the factors described in Part IV.C, infra. In the medical context, using an objective 
standard of materiality to determine what risks must be disclosed for informed consent can provide 
increased predictability for physicians in medical malpractice proceedings. See Canterbury v. Spence, 
464 F.2d 772, 787–88 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The objective standard, able to vary based on a defined set of 
conditions, can be expected to provide similarly predictable measures of liability to genetic 
researchers. 
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clinically actionable results. With these duties in place, researchers would 
have greater responsibility than they do under their present legal 
obligations, but clearly defining those responsibilities would allow 
researchers to understand and prepare for them in advance. Likewise, 
potential research participants would be able to rely on the consistent 
expectation and enforcement of these three duties. 
To best ensure dependability and uniformity, these duties must 
apply to all genetic studies, regardless of whether the institution is large 
or small, or whether the materials are taken directly from an individual 
or from the shelf of a biobank. Much of the literature on the return of 
results isolates this problem into a single setting (for example, treating 
primary and secondary research as wholly distinct issues) rather than 
viewing it from a broader perspective.121 But in order for potential 
participants to have a full understanding of their rights and for 
researchers to know exactly what they are obligated to do, both of which 
are imperative to prevent chilling the progress of genetic research, all 
genetic studies should be viewed under one cohesive model. Thus, rather 
than isolating results by context alone, the context of the study should be 
only one of several considerations in the determination of a researcher’s 
duty. 
A. Management of Incidental Findings 
To get IRB approval, research protocols should be required to 
include a plan for management of incidental findings. Requiring research 
designers to consider what kinds of incidental findings they might find 
and how they would deal with them in advance would better ensure that 
they keep their subjects’ interests in mind throughout the research 
process. This management duty arises in part from the ethical principles 
described in the Belmont Report,122 which requires “an adequate plan for 
debriefing subjects, when appropriate, and for dissemination of research 
results to them.”123 It also stems directly from the Common Rule, which 
codifies the need for an IRB to ensure suitable protections in every study 
that involves human subjects.124 Though the minor details of the specific 
management plans could be left to the judgment of individual researchers 
or biobanks, research institutions would, at a minimum, need to consider 
what types of findings would be most likely to arise and decide how and 
under what circumstances they would disclose those findings. 
Under federal oversight by the HHS, this condition would help 
achieve national uniformity in the field of genetic research by requiring a 
 
 121. See, e.g., Laura M. Beskow & Wylie Burke, Offering Individual Genetic Research Results: 
Context Matters, 38 Sci. Translational Med. 20 (2010). 
 122. See supra Part II.A. 
 123. The Belmont Report, supra note 56, at C.1. 
 124. See supra Part III.A. 
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consistent level of consideration of the issue of returning results, without 
imposing overly restrictive constraints that could limit the field’s 
development. This, in turn, would help standardize what types of results 
would be returned and thereby allow greater reliance by individuals who 
would better understand what to expect from participating in genetic 
research studies. In addition, asking study designers to think about the 
implications of incidental findings ahead of time would not only ensure 
appropriate administrative procedures, but would also make researchers 
more alert to the possibility that they might discover information that 
could be relevant to a subject’s health. This increase in understanding 
and awareness would alleviate some of the misalignment of interests 
about which the Grimes court was concerned.125 If researchers’ protocols 
explicitly required them to recognize their subjects’ interests, they would 
not only consider the societal impact of the study, but would also be 
required to keep in mind the individual participants’ interests throughout 
the research process. 
Notably, the duty described in this Subpart should be limited only to 
requiring a management plan. Neither federal nor state governments 
should require researchers to actively seek out incidental findings, as that 
could seriously impede the progress of research by distracting 
investigators from their primary purpose. Likewise, biobanks should—
within the existing guidelines and those proposed herein—make their 
own decisions about the precise guidelines that they will uphold with 
respect to return of results, as several already have,126 because they are 
most familiar with their own operations. With the advent of a legal duty 
to enforce those standards, biobanks could continue to develop their 
policies and even look to other biobanks to see what procedures are most 
effective, in order to work toward industry-wide best practices. For 
instance, if biobanks were required to report their plans at a federal 
level, researchers across the country could consider and integrate others’ 
policies into their own governance. This shared knowledge would benefit 
all genetic studies, whether they use biobanked or individually collected 
materials, and allow participants to rely on researchers to have a well-
tested strategy to deal with incidental findings. 
B. Fully Informed Consent 
As a part of their duties to provide informed consent, researchers 
should be required to fully describe and discuss the risks and benefits of 
knowing certain types of genetic information, in addition to the physical 
risks of the study. Participants should then be able to opt out of receiving 
results. Once planned for in their research protocols, this requirement 
 
 125. See Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 837–38 (Md. 2001). 
 126. See ALSPAC Ethics & Law Comm., supra note 55. 
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would not impose any significant burden on researchers. Nor is the 
requirement of fully informed consent controversial; it arises out of 
regulatory,127 common law,128 and ethical principles alike.129 
In a biobank setting, the researcher should also be made aware of the 
informed consent requirements so that she understands her responsibilities 
with regard to the participants’ rights.130 Because it is often difficult to 
track down individuals at the start of each study, contributors to 
biobanks could agree in advance to have their materials used in specific 
types of studies, which they could indicate on an intake form—for 
instance, by marking assent to cancer studies but not to mental health 
studies. When a study diverges significantly from the types described in 
the initial intake form, re-contact would be necessary to procure additional 
consent. Viewing the informed consent process as one in which the 
subjects entrust their privacy rights in their DNA to the researchers, this 
process would cement the researchers’ obligation to protect those rights 
while streamlining the research process as much as possible.131 
The heightened informed consent requirement arises from legal and 
ethical foundations and would provide several benefits to research 
participants. Based on both the regulations in the Common Rule and the 
special relationship between researchers and subjects,132 it would help 
alleviate the problem of therapeutic misconception. By clarifying the 
precise nature of the research, full informed consent would ensure that 
participants understand exactly what they are agreeing to when deciding 
whether to be informed of certain types of results. Furthermore, a full 
explanation of what one could expect by donating genetic material to a 
study that would provide no subsequent feedback would provide crucial 
respect for individual autonomy. The requirement of an opt-out 
provision would ensure that participants who decide they do not want to 
know certain kinds of results are able to exercise that choice. 
The duty of fully informed consent should aim to set a standard for 
communication between researchers and participants, even if that means 
that some individuals are dissuaded from participating in genetic 
research by what they learn during the informed consent process. Over 
time, standardized researcher-subject communication would help 
develop a sense of trust in the system that would ultimately strengthen 
public support for genetic research.133 Because all parties involved stand 
 
 127. See, e.g., Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2009). 
 128. See, e.g., Grimes, 782 A.2d at 850–51. 
 129. See, e.g., The Belmont Report, supra note 56, at C.1. 
 130. See Richardson & Cho, supra note 108, at 471. 
 131. Id. at 469. 
 132. See supra notes 127–128. 
 133. See, e.g., Henry T. Greely, The Uneasy Ethical and Legal Underpinnings of Large-Scale 
Genomic Biobanks, 8 Ann. Rev. Genomics & Hum. Genetics 343, 344 (2007) (“[B]y failing to respect 
donors, the biobanks put at risk the long-term interests of biomedical science, which can only prosper 
Alessi_64-HLJ-1697 (Do Not Delete) 9/25/2013 12:43 PM 
1722 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:1697 
to benefit from the enforcement of fully informed consent as to the 
return of genetic research results, it should be a priority in framing a set 
of responsibilities. 
C. Disclosure of Limited Clinically Actionable Results 
Finally, researchers should have a legal duty to offer to disclose 
certain results that present a serious and foreseeable harm and to have a 
plan for referral to genetic counseling. Like having a management plan, 
this would ensure both procedural protections for and thoughtful 
consideration of the possibility of actionable results before a study 
begins. By requiring only that researchers offer to disclose their findings, 
this duty would respect the participants’ rights to know their personal 
information and, alternatively, to exercise personal autonomy should 
they not want to know. Stemming in large part from the special 
relationship between genetic researchers and their human subjects, this 
duty to warn would require that a researcher disclose genetic information 
if that information could help a participant avoid a serious and 
foreseeable harm.134 To narrow the reach of the duty, it is critical to 
determine what types of genetic results would constitute such harm. 
A starting point is that results should only be returned when they 
are “clinically actionable”—that is, when they have the “potential to 
change immediate medical care.”135 It is not sufficient, however, that a 
finding be medically related, because the burden on the researcher to 
disclose all potential medical risks would be overwhelming. Several 
variables interplay in the judgment of which clinically actionable results 
must be disclosed, most importantly the severity of the disease (that is, 
the finding’s potential impact on health or reproductive decisionmaking), 
the probability of actually developing the disease, and the availability 
and effectiveness of treatment. The greater the degree to which these 
factors are present, the more likely it should be that the researcher has a 
duty to inform the subject of the genetic finding. 
Depending on the extent of the severity, probability, and treatability, 
weighing these factors can split results into multiple categories of clinical 
actionability: results that must be returned, results that may be returned at 
the researcher’s discretion, and results that may never be returned.136 For 
example, the discovery of a genetic predisposition to a severe or life-
threatening disease that is highly likely to materialize and for which 
 
with the trust and support of the population.”). 
 134. See supra notes 113–115 and accompanying text. 
 135. Fullerton et al., supra note 3, at 425. 
 136. See Wolf et al., supra note 25, at 235 tbl.5. Wolf describes the three categories as those in 
which disclosing results has a “Strong Net Benefit,” a “Possible Net Benefit,” or an “Unlikely Net 
Benefit.” Id. 
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treatment is available would always need to be reported.137 On the other 
hand, a result that does not by itself carry any health implications, such as 
misattributed paternity, would not require disclosure.138 
The degree of clinical actionability alone, however, does not clarify 
what researchers should be required to disclose when a finding falls in 
the middle of this spectrum. In making determinations about which of 
these results to share, researchers must consider additional factors, 
especially when those factors have powerful ethical implications.139 These 
factors should include the extent to which the subject relies on the 
researcher for getting care and whether the subject is particularly 
vulnerable.140 The possible negative consequences that the participant 
faces as a result of her participation in the research—for instance, the 
potential that her genetic information could be used for discriminatory 
purposes if her DNA makeup were to be exposed—should also be 
considered.141 When de-identified information is easily re-linked to 
subjects, it should be imperative, as a matter of fairness and reciprocity, 
to return information to them because of their increased vulnerability.142 
Furthermore, the ease of return should play a crucial role. If there is 
a minimal burden on the researcher to return the information, as is 
generally the case the closer the finding is in time and subject matter to 
the initial study, she has a much less compelling reason not to return the 
results.143 For instance, if a finding were closely related to the study’s 
aims, not only would the burden likely be minimal, but the participant’s 
reliance on the researcher would also likely be strong.144 Similarly, in 
certain types of studies, such as pedigree studies, researchers may have 
long-term relationships with their subjects that facilitate trust and 
communication.145 In contrast, researchers who use biobanked materials 
 
 137. See id. 
 138. See id.; see also Cho, supra note 28, at 282 (“[T]he potential benefits of genetic research may 
be informational only, rather than directly providing therapeutic value. Nevertheless, consideration of 
circumstances in which the information might change clinical decisions, such as the availability of an 
effective intervention or prevention, is important.”). 
 139. Cf. Greely, supra note 133, at 360 (“Regardless of the moral and legal obligations, it would be 
extremely unwise for researchers not to disclose such risks. Consider what happens after the first 
lawsuit by the bereaved family of a research subject whose life would have been saved had researchers 
revealed a risk they discovered. Whether or not the plaintiffs win, those researchers and their 
institution will be branded as heartless, interested in subjects only as laboratory animals, and all 
biomedical research will feel the fallout.”). 
 140. See Richardson & Cho, supra note 108, at 469 tbl.1. Vulnerability is measured by asking: 
“How much difference would getting the information in question make to the health or welfare of the 
participant?” Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. See Cho, supra note 28, at 282–83. 
 144. See, e.g., Ewen Callaway, Gene Hunt Is on for Mental Disability, 484 Nature 302, 303 (2012). 
 145. Cho, supra note 28, at 282–83. 
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may have no contact with the human subjects themselves, and thus the 
burden of returning results may be significantly greater.146 
The balance of these factors should depend on the particulars of the 
study and the finding in question. For example, one research project’s 
ethical review board struggled to determine whether an incidental 
finding of an increased risk of colon cancer must be disclosed when 
discovered during a study on mental disabilities in children.147 Although 
the board decided to disclose the information in one instance on the 
theory that the child patients relied on the researchers for medical 
information, researchers in similar studies choose not to disclose such 
findings.148 Such a determination could rightly vary between studies due 
to the structure of the study and the relationship and reliance between 
the researcher and the subject. 
Other determinations should be more dependent on the nature of 
the disease. For example, one review board determined that a mutation 
of a gene that predisposes individuals to deep vein thrombosis and 
pulmonary embolisms should be disclosed only when an individual is 
homozygous for the mutation because the increase in risk for the disease 
only at that point rises to the level at which preventative measures 
outweigh the risks of “creating ‘worried well’ individuals among those 
still unlikely to develop symptoms.”149 Despite their complicated and 
delicate nature, however, the interrelationship of these factors provides a 
framework for making these decisions. 
Due to their complexity, determinations about precisely which 
results should be returned to research participants should be made by 
boards consisting of geneticists, policymakers, and others who are 
familiar with the impact of different genes and diseases. These 
evaluations should evolve over time as treatments become more readily 
available, tests improve in their accuracy, and electronic medical records 
make it easier to share information about both clinical health and 
genetics.150 One promising solution to these challenges would be to 
establish ongoing IRB subcommittees that would implement guidelines 
for what types of findings researchers should return and act as screening 
boards to review any results that arise.151 These subcommittees could also 
provide a mechanism for national review by reporting their decisions to a 
centralized board, which over time would help develop a uniform 
 
 146. See id. at 282. 
 147. Id. at 282–83. 
 148. Id.  
 149. Fullerton et al., supra note 3, at 426. 
 150. Id. at 428. Increasing access to electronic medical records may help determine whether it is 
necessary to provide results: If a person already shows clinical signs of an otherwise actionable result, 
for instance, it may be unnecessary to counsel her about her genetic predisposition. Id. 
 151. See id. at 425. 
Alessi_64-HLJ-1697 (Do Not Delete) 9/25/2013 12:43 PM 
August 2013] RETURN OF RESULTS IN GENETIC TESTING 1725 
national consensus as to which results should be returned. Removing the 
responsibility for these kinds of judgment calls from the researcher 
would both conserve research resources and ensure appropriate review 
by a board that is familiar with the ever-changing clinical and ethical 
implications of returning results. 
Once the IRB subcommittee has determined that results must be 
communicated, researchers would have a duty to refer the participant to 
a genetic counselor when the information has implications that the 
researcher is unable to communicate to the subject herself. Although 
researchers generally hold the most information about the subject’s 
genetics, they do not have the clinical training or experience of physicians 
and therefore may be ineffective when communicating serious and 
oftentimes confusing genetic information to a layperson.152 But simply 
suggesting that “donors seek additional help and guidance from physicians 
or genetic counselors on the assumption they will do so is shortsighted and 
does not take into account the realities of the situation: there is evidence 
that many physicians still do not possess sufficient understanding of the 
implications of genetic tests.”153 Therefore, researchers should be 
responsible for actively connecting their subjects to genetic counselors 
who can thoroughly explain the implications of any findings. 
The requirement of referral for genetic counseling should also apply 
in the context of biobanking. Some biobanks choose not to engage in 
individual feedback at all because of the fear that information disclosed 
outside of the clinical setting provides neither a full view of the 
individual’s medical record nor appropriate counseling.154 These policies, 
however, prevent subjects from learning of even the most important 
information. To preserve their right to their personal information, the 
duty to refer to a genetic counselor would guarantee that feedback would 
be given in an appropriate manner but would not overburden a 
researcher who is untrained in and unprepared for providing genetic 
information in a clinical setting. 
Conclusion 
By analyzing and balancing the varying perspectives on returning 
genetic research results while keeping in mind relevant practical, ethical, 
and legal considerations, this Article has aimed to develop limited, 
mutually beneficial duties that better align the interests and incentives of 
the involved parties. With so much at stake on all sides of the issue, this 
is a crucial point in the development of the laws and policies that impact 
the field of genetic research. Establishing the limited duties described in 
 
 152. See Fisher, supra note 74, at 459. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Zawati & Rioux, supra note 28, at 616; see U.K. Biobank, supra note 33, at 7. 
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this Article would clarify subjects’ and researchers’ respective rights and 
responsibilities and ensure their ongoing enforcement. These duties 
would help shape society’s understanding of the interplay between 
science, ethics, and law in a manner that not only promotes ongoing 
scientific development, but also protects the people who volunteer their 
bodies to make such research possible. 
 
